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Abstract
This study investigates the short-run and long-run impact of coups on Thailand’s finan-
cial markets. Using daily data from the stock and foreign exchange markets during the 
period 2005–2017, the study shows (1) both coups in 2006 and in 2014 exert short-run 
impact on Thailand’s stock and foreign exchange markets; (2) however, the direction 
and magnitude of impact are different and opposite in the two coups; and (3) in the 
long run, the coups exhibit minimal impact on the currency market, but induce better 
market performance (positive return and decrease in the return volatility) despite an 
increase in liquidity risk of the stock market. Against common beliefs about negative 
consequences of the coup d’états, this study suggests that the uncertainty surrounding 
coups can bring good investment opportunities for investors to earn abnormal prof-
its. Moreover, in the long term, the coup can drive the country to better stability and 
development.
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INTRODUCTION
Thailand is known as a country with high political instability in Asia 
among other countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and North 
Korea. As of 2015, Thailand was ranked 163rd out of 194 countries 
in the world in terms of political stability (TheGlobalEconomy.com, 
2015). Within eight years since 2006, Thailand has seen two coups and 
the most recent coup in 2014 is marked as the 12th coup in the country 
since 1932. The coups and associated political instability were blamed 
for the country’s slow economic development (International Monetary 
Fund, 2015). However, Thailand’s financial market has grown rap-
idly since the recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In 2016, 
Thailand was considered as the second best-performing stock market 
in Asia with more than 19% year-to-date return of Thai SET50 index 
(Chandran, 2017). In addition, the Thai Baht appreciated 7.8% against 
the US dollar to become Asia’s best performing currency in 2017 
(Reuters, 2017). It is, therefore, interesting to determine if there is any 
relationship between the coups and financial market quality. In other 
words, whether the coups affect financial market quality in Thailand. 
This study extends the study of Lumiajiak, Treepongkaruna, Wee, and 
Brooks (2014) by taking into account the effect of the most recent 2014 
coup in addition to the 2006 coup. As suggested by Duggan (2004), 
investors may behave differently to different coups due to their sys-
tematic differences. We also investigate the short-run and long-run 
impact of coups on Thailand’s financial markets, specifically the Stock 
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Exchange of Thailand (SET) and the Foreign Exchange USD/THB market. However, rather than using 
the realized return, volatility, liquidity and liquidity risk, we use the mean-adjusted model to determine 
the abnormal value of these measures as suggested for event studies. In addition, this method proved to 
be as efficient as other complicated methods (Brown & Warner, 1985). 
The results of this study contribute to the literature on coup’s effects and the role of political risk in a 
country’s financial markets. Specifically, the study results showed (1) both coups in 2006 and 2014 ex-
erted short-run impact on Thailand’s stock and foreign exchange markets; (2) however, the direction 
and magnitude of impact were different and opposite in the two coups; (3) in the long run, the coups had 
little impact on the currency market, but induced better market performance (positive return, decrease 
in the return volatility) despite an increase in the liquidity risk of the stock market. The study results 
provide support for the positive effects of coups in contrast to the traditional negative consequences. 
The uncertainty surrounding the coups can bring good investment opportunities to investors to earn 
abnormal profits. Moreover, in the long term, the coup can drive the country to better stability and 
development. 
The next section briefly review related literature about coups and the effect of political risk on the per-
formance of financial markets. Section 2 presents an overview about political environment and coups in 
Thailand. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The summary statistics and empirical results 
are discussed in section 4, and last section concludes the study.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Coup is a political event related to the use of military 
power and the change of government leaders, and 
is a source of political risk (Powell & Thyne, 2011). 
Previous studies have shown that political risk has 
great influence on stock market development (Perotti 
& van Oijen, 2001; Yartey, 2008). Particularly, the ef-
fect is stronger in emerging than developed markets 
due to more barriers, such as low transparency, less 
reliable data, and higher level of information asym-
metry (Bilson, Brailsford, & Hooper, 2002; Brooks & 
Mosley, 2007; Erb, Harvey, & Viskanta, 1996). It has 
been argued that higher risk associated with politi-
cal risk can bring abnormal stock returns (Amihud 
& Wohl, 2004; Beaulieu, Cosset, & Essaddam, 2006; 
Bilson et al., 2002; Chen, Bin, & Chen, 2005; Fengs, 
2001; Kim & Mei, 2001; Ma, Sun, & Tang, 2003; 
Pantzalis, Stangeland, & Turtle, 2000). The following 
relationship hypothesis is offered:
H1: The coup has a positive effect on the abnor-
mal return of Thai stock market.
However, political risk also affects market vola-
tility. For example, Chan and Wei (1996) showed 
that political shocks such as the news about Sino-
British collaboration on Hong Kong affairs sig-
nificantly affected the volatility of the stock mar-
ket due to the impact of both market-wide and 
substitution effects. Białkowski, Gottschalk, and 
Wisniewski (2008) when studying the behavior 
of stock market during national elections in 27 
OECD countries also showed that the stock mar-
ket participants acted more aggressively when 
there were increasing election shocks caused by 
narrow margin of victory or changes in the politi-
cal inclination of the government. We hypothesize 
the following relationships:
H2: The coup brings more volatility to Thai stock 
market.
H3: The coup increases the liquidity risk of Thai 
stock market.
However, not many studies investigate how politi-
cal risk affects the stock trading volume, except for 
a few studies, such as Chan, Chui, and Kwok (2001) 
and Leblang and Mukherjee (2005). Chan et al.’s 
(2001) study showed that political news negatively 
impacted the trading volume on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange due to investors’ perceptual biases 
and the less quality of information from political 
news. On the other hand, Leblang and Mukherjee 
(2005) found that the political effect depended on 
the anticipation of the winning party. We hypoth-
esize the following relationships:
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H4a: The coup has a negative effect on the liquid-
ity of Thai stock market.
H4b: The coup has a positive effect on the liquidity 
of Thai stock market.
The effect of political risk is also prominent in 
the foreign exchange market. Bachman (1992) ar-
gued that political risk played an important role 
in explaining the significant changes in forward 
exchange bias. Blomberg and Hess (1997) also 
criticized the poor performance of standard ex-
change rate forecasting models and posited that 
this was due to the omission of political factors. 
Freeman, Hays, and Stix (2000) added that in 
democratic-politic countries, the currency traders 
were forced to continuously revise their expecta-
tions about election results and government sur-
vival. Therefore, exchange rate would be affected 
in a way that exhibited different market regimes. 
In addition, this effect depended on the degree of 
democracy and the transparency of the policy-
making (Hays, Freeman, & Nesseth, 2003). The 
following hypothesis is offered:
H5: The coup has a positive effect on abnormal 
return of Thai foreign exchange market.
In terms of market volatility, Lobo and Tufte (1998) 
found that the exchange rate volatility of the JPY, 
GBP, DEM and CAD against the USD was affect-
ed by political factors, such as electoral cycle and/
or the political party. Similar findings were also 
found for the Greek foreign exchange rate (Siokis 
& Kapopoulos, 2003). In Latin America, Cermeño, 
Grier, and Grier (2010) proved that the foreign 
exchange rate was more volatile in post-election 
period. Liu and Pauwels (2012) also showed that 
external political pressures from other countries 
such as the U.S., the EU and Japan caused the vol-
atility of Renminbi. The following hypothesis is 
offered:
H6: The coup has a positive effect on return vola-
tility of Thai foreign exchange market.
Given the substantial effort in investigating the ef-
fect of political risk on the currency market, stud-
ies on liquidity effects have not received adequate 
attention. Lumiajiak et al.’s (2014) study examined 
this effect on Thai foreign exchange market. The 
authors showed that the 2006 coup reduced the 
bid-ask spread of the USD/THB and increased its 
volatility. However, this effect was short-run. In 
the long run, a reverse reaction was found. The 
following hypotheses are offered:
H7: The coup has a positive effect on the liquidity 
of Thai foreign exchange market.
H8: The coup has a positive effect on the liquidity 
risk of Thai foreign exchange market.
1.1. Overview of political 
environment and coups  
in Thailand
Since 1932, Thailand has followed the constitu-
tional monarchy with the King as the head of the 
country and the Prime Minister (PM) leading the 
government. However, Thailand is not under the 
full democratic country. Over the past 80 years, 
the country has seen 12 coups followed by the rul-
ing of the military leaders. The two recent coups 
took place in 2006 and 2014. Table 1 summarizes 
key political events in Thailand surrounding the 
two coups from 2005 to 2017. 
Among the causes of coups in Thailand, the pres-
ervation of military power has been the most im-
portant factor. The history of Thailand politic has 
not seen any government survived for the full 
term until 2005 when Thaksin Shinnawatt com-
pleted his term in the government and won the 
election for the second term. With the support 
from his majority – Thai Rak Thai party, Thaksin 
gained control over the military. Thaksin was 
widely supported by the rural and low-income 
class. His rise to power led to the polarization of 
the country between one side comprising Thaksin, 
his Thai Rak Thai party and the police, and the 
other side including the military, the monarchy 
and the Democrats. 
Thaksin was supported by the rural and low-in-
come class, but he was opposed by the urban and 
middle class for corruption and untrustworthiness. 
The opposition accelerated in 2005 with Thaksin 
election winning for the second term. This led to 
the conflicts between the Red Shirt – supporters 
of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party – and the Yellow 
Shirt – opponents of Thai Rak Thai and supported 
71
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2018
by the Democrat party. The Yellow Shirt, formal-
ly known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD), accused Thaksin of corruption, nepotism, 
interference in independent agencies, against the 
monarchy, vote buying, plans to exasperate the 
violence, and depressing the military (Malesky 
& Samphantharak, 2011; The Nation, 2006). They 
held mass protests calling for Thaksin’s resigna-
tion and impeachment. The protests escalated 
during first half of 2006 and reached the peak on 
September 19, 2006, when the military leaders 
staged a bloodless coup. 
During the post 2006 coup period, the politi-
cal conflicts continued. Despite being ousted, 
Thaksin maintained his influence through proxy 
Prime Ministers. This raised the existing tension 
between the elected government and the military, 
the monarchy and the anti-Thaksin group – PAD. 
The Thai Rak Thai party was dissolved in May 
2007, but Thaksin-supporting parties such as The 
People Power Party (PPP) and Pheu Thai Party 
(PTP) still held a majority in the parliament. The 
social polarization peaked with mass protests by 
the Red Shirt and the Yellow Shirt during 2006–
2011. These two groups put the government under-
pressured through mass rallies, control of govern-
ment buildings and transportation. Within just 
four years (2007–2011), the country changed leadn-
ers five times. Particularly, in 2010, the Red Shirt’s 
protests came into violence with near 100 people 
dead and more than 2,000 injured (Human Rights 
Watch, 2011). 
Protests resurfaced in October 2013 follow-
ing the pronouncement of Yingluck’s govern-
ment about a proposed amnesty bill, which al-
lowed Thaksin to re-enter Thailand. Organized 
by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee 
(PDRC), the protests accused Yingluck’s admin-
istration as corrupt, illegal, and a representative 
for Thaksin. The PDRC was considered to be 
Yellow Shirt supporters, whose followers com-
prised the middle class living in Bangkok and 
provinces. In the meantime, the Red Shirt pro-
tested the caretaker government and called for 
Table 1. Thailand’s key political events (2005 to 2017)
Source: BBC (2017), CNN (2011).
Date Events Political regimes
March 2005 Thaksin Shinnawatt became PM for the second term
Shinnawatt led 
government
January 2006 Negative public opinions about the sale of The Shinawatra family’s shares of the country’s largest telecommunications company Shin Corp
March 2006 Mass rallies by People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) against PM Thaksin
April-May 2006 Snap election called by PM Thaksin Shinnawatt was boycotted by the opposition parties and annulled
September 19, 2006 Bloodless coup staged by the military leaders. An interim civilian government was formed Military led government
October 01, 2006 Retired General Surayud Chulanont was appointed the interim PM
Independently led 
government
August 20, 2007 Approval and promulgation of the new Constitution
December 23, 2007 National parliamentary election. The People Power Party (PPP) won the most votes
January 29, 2008 Samak Sundaravej was elected as the new PM
Shinnawatt led 
governmentSeptember 09, 2008 PM Samak Sundaravej was fired by the Constitutional court and Somchai Wongsawat was appointed as the new PM
December 02, 2008 The governing PPP was disbanded and PM Somchai Wongsawat was forbidden from politics
Independently led 
government
December 15, 2008 The leader of the opposite party Abhisit Vejjajiva became the new Prime Minister
Democrat party led 
government
July 03, 2011 Yingluck Shinawatra – Thaksin’s sister – became the next PM
Shinnawatt led 
governmentOctober 2013
Protest resurfaced following the pronouncement of Yingluck’s government 
about a proposed amnesty bill which allowed Thaksin to re-enter Thailand
May 20, 2014 The Royal Thai Army imposed martial law across the country
May 22, 2014
The military formally launched a coup against the temporary government 
and established a junta named National Peace and Order Maintaining 
Council (NPOMC) to rule the country
Military led government
Note: Table 1 shows the Shinnawatt led government, Democrat party led government and Military led government that take 
turns to run the country. These events provide evidences of the highly instable political environment in Thailand. The main 
cause has been blamed to the military enforcement and the conflicts of interest between political groups (Islam & Chowdhury, 
2004). For example, it is argued that there is a close relationship between the military and the monarchy.
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the snap election. The conflicts and protests be-
tween groups were associated with recurrent vio-
lence and the snap election results was annulled 
by the Constitutional Court. Three months later, 
the military stepped in by declaring martial law 
across the country and then formally launched a 
coup on May 22, 2014. 
The 2006 and 2014 coups are regarded as twin 
coups due to their relation to Thaksin’s politi-
cal influence and the same origination from the 
military. However, the 2014 coup is different from 
other coups in Thailand political history by the 
tight control of the military, opposition suppres-
sion, political debate restriction and operation of a 
large-scale innovation program (Baker, 2016).
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
2.1. Data and key variables of interest
Two instruments are used to measure the overall 
health of Thai financial markets: the USD/THB 
and the SET Index. Data used in the study include 
the tick-by-tick bid-ask quotes for the USD/THB 
and the SET Index including its trading volume 
from April 21, 2005 to September 13, 2017. This 
period covers two recent coup d’états in Thailand, 
governments, led by Democrat, Thai Rak Thai, 
Independent parties and Military. Data were ex-
tracted from Thomson Reuters Tick History data-
base provided by the Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). Daily trading vol-
ume by trader type was sourced from the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. We measure market quality 
at daily interval in four dimensions: return, return 
volatility, liquidity and liquidity volatility. We de-
fine daily return itR  as follows:
, ,
1
,
D
it i d t
d
R r
=
=∑  (1)
where , ,i d tr  is the d
th five-minute return on in-
strument i  during day t  and D  is the total 
number of all five-minute return intervals during 
a trading day. The , ,i d tr  on the SET Index is cal-
culated from the price level of the SET Index at a 
five-minute interval. The , ,i d tr  for the USD/THB is 
computed from the mid-price of the USD/THB at 
a five-minute interval. 
Each instrument volatility is measured using 
intra-day data following Andersen et al. (2003). 
Thus, the daily realized volatility itRV  is calcu-
lated as follows:
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D
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For liquidity measure, we use different proxy 
for the USD/THB and the SET Index, since bid-
ask prices are not available for the SET Index. 
Specifically, we use the daily average of the bid-
ask spread to measure the liquidity of USD/THB 
as follows:
, ,
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D
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d
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s
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D
==
∑
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where ,d ts  is the d
th five-minute bid-ask spread 
in the USD/THB during day t  and D  is the total 
number of all five-minute intervals during day .t  
A high bid-ask spread indicates the less liquidity of 
the foreign exchange market. Data on the bid-ask 
spread are not available for the SET Index, thus 
the natural logarithm of the daily trading vol-
ume is employed as our proxy for liquidity of the 
SET Index (LNV). The liquidity proxy for the SET 
Index exhibits opposite direction of the USD/THB 
such that the greater trading volume in the SET 
Index represents the better liquidity of the Thai 
stock market.
Finally, to measure variability of liquidity, we use 
the daily standard deviation of the liquidity. The 
liquidity volatility of the USD/THB is defined as 
follows:
2
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1 .
1
D
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d
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Similarly, the variability of liquidity on the SET 
Index is defined as follows:
2
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1
D
i d t i t
d
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where , ,i d tv  is the natural logarithm of the d
th 
five-minute trading volume in day ;t  ts  and tv  
are the daily average of the five-minute bid-ask 
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spread in the USD/THB and the daily average of 
the natural logarithm of the trading volume at 
five-minute intervals in day ,t  respectively.
2.2. Method
We conduct both short-run and long-run analy-
sis as follows. First, to measure short-term mar-
ket reactions to the Military coup d’états, we 
employ a mean-adjusted event study approach. 
Our event date (day 0) is the date that the 
Military coup d’états takes place (September 19, 
2006 for first coup and May 22, 2014 for second 
coup). We define various event windows relative 
to the military coup d’états event to quantify 
the effects of coup d’états on four dimensions of 
market quality separately (i.e., [–60, –1] up to [0, 
60]). We choose days –120 to –61 as our estima-
tion window. 
For example, to measure market performance via 
the return, we first calculate the daily abnormal 
return ( )itAR  for instrument i  (e.g., USD/THB 
and SET) in the event window as follows:
61
120
,it it ij
j
AR R R
−
=−
= − ∑  (5)
where itR  is the daily return for instrument i  on 
day .t  To ascertain the magnitude of abnormal 
returns over the entire event window, we calcu-
late the cumulative abnormal return ( )itCAR  as 
follows:
1
0
for event windows preceding the event date
for event windows following the event date 
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where { }60, 40, 20, 10, 5,5,10,20,40,60 .m = − − − − −  
For the other dimensions of market quality, we 
measure abnormal return volatility (market risk), 
abnormal liquidity and abnormal liquidity volatil-
ity and their cumulative counterparts in the same 
manner. 
In addition, we evaluate the difference between 
daily average abnormal return (return volatil-
ity, liquidity and liquidity volatility) of the event 
date, day 0 (i.e. September 19, 2006 for first coup 
and May 22, 2014 for second coup) with the dai-
ly average abnormal return (return volatility, li-
quidity and liquidity volatility) 5, 10, 20, 40 and 
60 days prior to day 0. Finally, we compare the 
daily average abnormal return (return volatility, 
liquidity and liquidity volatility) between 60, 40, 
20, 10 and 5 days pre- and post-military coup 
date. 
To formally test both short-run and long-run 
market reactions to the 2006 and 2014 military 
coup d’états in Thailand, we estimate a regres-
sion of four key variables of interests ( ) ,ity  
which are return, return volatility, liquidity and 
liquidity volatility on a set of independent and 
control variables ( ), .it ex  Standard errors are 
corrected using HAC Newey-West method. The 
regression is as derived as follows:
,
1
,
n
it it e it e it
e
y x uα β
=
= + +∑  (7)
where itu  is the normally distributed error term 
with zero mean and variance of one. 
Our key independent variables include SR5_C1, 
SR10_C1, SR20_C1, SR40_C1 and SR60_C1 
which capture the short-term effect of the coup 
d’états of 2006; SR5_C2, SR10_C2, SR20_C2, 
SR40_C2 and SR60_C2 to capture the short-
term effect of the coup d’états of 2014. These are 
dummy variables and set to 1 for the windows 
[0, 5], [6, 10], [11, 20], [21, 40] and [41, 60], re-
spectively, with date 0 being the coup date (i.e. 
September 19, 2006 for first coup and May 22, 
2014 for second coup). We also include the vari-
able “Military_led” to capture the long-term ef-
fect of the coup. This is also a dummy variable 
equal 1 for the period the military takes control, 
and 0 otherwise. Table 1 shows the Military led 
period from September 19, 2006 to September 
30, 2006 and May 22, 2014 to September 13, 2017. 
In addition, the financial market is also affected 
by the trading activities of foreign investors. To 
capture this effect, we include “FC_Buy” vari-
able, which is the percentage of net purchases in 
Thai Baht on the Thai stock market by foreign 
investors. This variable is also interacted with 
coup-related variables to examine the modera-
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tion effect of the foreign investors’ net purchase 
on the relationship between the coup and the fi-
nancial markets.
The control variables include lags of dependent 
variables to capture the AR structure in return, 
return volatility, liquidity and liquidity volatility 
for both stock and currency markets. The choice 
of lag lengths to be included closely follows the 
study of Lumiajiak et al. (2014). Acknowledging 
that the performance of the financial market of 
a country can be affected by the financial mar-
ket in other countries, we include daily return 
on S&P 500 (S&P) to control for the world stock 
market cycle. In addition, since the study cov-
ers the global financial crisis, a dummy variable 
“GFC” is included to capture this effect. GFC is 
set to 1 for the period from July 26, 2007 to July 
30, 2010, and 0 otherwise. For the stock mar-
ket, we also include “Quote” to control for the 
trading volume and “AvgTBT” to control for the 
frequency of trading activities. For the currency 
market, we include “Quoter” to control for the 
competition in the market. 
Definition of the regression variables (equa-
tion 7) and their measurements are provided in 
the Appendix.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.1. Summary statistics
Together with changes in the government, the 
Thai stock market and foreign exchange mar-
ket exhibit different movement patterns. The 
foreign exchange market shows the most vola-
tility during the Independent led period, which 
might be attributed to the high uncertainty of 
the new election result (see Figure 1). Similar 
trend is also found for the Thai stock market. 
However, the market f luctuates greatly during 
Shin led period, particularly during the protests 
(see Figure 2). The returns of both the stock and 
foreign exchange markets are also the highest 
during these uncertain periods. 
The ratio of net stock market purchase by foreign 
investors (FC_Buy) experiences an increase trend 
before June 2007 and then decreases sharply dur-
ing the second half of the Independent led and 
Shin led periods (Sundaravej as PM). After a rel-
atively stable period during the Democracy and 
Shin led government (Yingluck as PM), the for-
eign stock purchase reduces before and after the 
coup in 2014, but rebounced from the beginning 
of 2015 (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 1. Thai Government and returns of USD/THB (USD/THB_R)  
(April 2005 – April 2017)
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Figure 2. Thai Government and returns of SET index (SET_R, scaled by 10)  
(April 2005 – April 2017)
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Figure 3. Thai Government and net stock purchase by foreign investors (FCBuy)  
(April 2005 – April 2017)
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The summary statistics in Table 2 further 
shows that when the Military led government 
is in power, the USD/THB return is less vola-
tile, has higher liquidity and lower liquidity risk. 
However, for the Thai stock market, although 
the SET return is less volatile, its liquidity risk 
during this period is higher than that in non-
Military led period. In both periods, there was 
no difference in the return of stock and foreign 
exchange markets.
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3.1.1. Short-run market reactions 
Figure 4 plots the cumulative abnormal measures 
for the SET Index surrounding the two military 
coup d’états in Thailand during our sample period. 
Consistent with Lumjiak et al. (2014), we find both 
military coup d’états in 2006 and 2014 improve 
market quality in the Thai stock market in three 
dimensions. Specifically, the 2006 military coup 
d’états increases abnormal returns and reduces 
the volatility in return and liquidity, but results 
in the reduction in trading volume. In compari-
son to the 2006 military coup d’états, we detect 
slightly smaller increase in the abnormal returns, 
but much higher (lower) volatility in liquidity (re-
turn) after the 2014 military coup d’états. Further, 
the 2014 military coup d’états substantially im-
prove liquidity in the market. Overall, the Thai 
stock market welcomes the intervention by mili-
tary coup d’états to bring stability into the overall 
economy. 
Similarly, we plot the cumulative abnormal mea-
sures for the USD/THB surrounding the two mili-
tary coup d’états in Thailand during our sample 
period in Figure 5. While the 2006 military coup 
d’états improves only two dimensions (improved 
liquidity and lower risk in liquidity) of Thai cur-
rency market quality, the 2014 military coup 
d’états advances all four dimensions in the USD/
THB market. It should be noted that the increase 
in abnormal return in the USD/THB implies the 
appreciation in the US dollar against the Thai 
Baht. However, our findings show the Thai Baht 
strengthen after the 2014 Military coup d’états. 
Again, the military intervention is welcomed by 
investors.
The findings are against the common beliefs that 
the coup d’états associated with political uncer-
tainty and instability would have negative effect 
on the financial markets (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; 
Roe & Siegel, 2011). In Thailand context, it was ex-
pected that the coup would dampen the investor 
confidence (McGeown, 2007), signal the weak-
ness in the future government and there would be 
likely a devaluation of Thai assets (Xie, 2006, cit2-
ed in Lumiajiak et al. (2014), as well as an under-
mining of the investment climate (The Economic 
Times, 2006). Steve Vickers & Associates even 
warned that “Previous assumptions that military 
coup will not affect foreign businesses or interests 
Table 2. Summary statistics
Military_led Non-Military_led Military_led vs.non-Military_led
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Diff. T-stat
Panel A. USD/THB
Return 1,030 0.00001 0.00244 –0.01136 0.01372 2,643 –0.0001 0.0057 –0.1103 0.1095 0.00008 –0.5540
RV 1,030 0.00003 0.00002 0.00000 0.00026 2,643 0.0062 0.0230 0.0000 0.2861 –0.00619 13.845
LIQ 1,030 0.02381 0.00705 0.01833 0.08000 2,643 0.0565 0.0456 0.0200 0.5083 –0.03265 35.703
RVS 1,030 0.00827 0.00522 0.00000 0.03671 2,643 0.0309 0.0416 0.0000 0.3199 –0.02258 27.381
S&P 1,030 0.00028 0.00794 –0.03900 0.03900 2,643 0.0003 0.0133 –0.0950 0.1160 –0.00007 0.1904
Quote 1,030 5150.19 3804.23 2.00000 14,736 2,643 403 303 1 2,819 4746.70 –39.995
AvgTBT 1,030 593.33 4928.99 5.80341 91,073 2,643 3,065 10,835 31 180,938 –2471.79 9.4787
Quoter 1,030 13.10 5.49 1.00 33.00 2,643 23 9 1 40 –9.91183 39.620
Panel B. SET Index
Return 819 0.0001 0.0087 –0.0526 0.0432 2,205 0.0003 0.0155 –0.1709 0.1132 –0.00021 0.4718
RV 819 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0031 2,205 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.0130 –0.00011 8.6711
LNV 819 0.0003 0.2906 –1.3155 1.6006 2,205 0.0037 0.3429 –1.2342 3.1433 –0.00341 0.2723
LIQV 819 0.4292 0.0687 0.1589 1.1027 2,205 0.4213 0.0935 0.0000 1.8126 0.00787 –2.5257
S&P 819 0.0003 0.0080 –0.0394 0.0390 2,205 0.0004 0.0138 –0.0952 0.1158 –0.00006 0.1383
Quote 819 1149.30 62.36 392 1203 2,205 1405.59 800.25 1 2402 –256.296 14.918
AvgTBT 819 112.67 73.13 72.15 450.78 2,205 299.17 3939.66 35.97 98162 –186.496 2.2218
FC_Buy 819 0.26 0.07 0.07 0.62 2,205 0.26 0.08 0.04 0.58 –0.00735 2.4417
Notes: Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis for the USD/THB (Panel A) and SET 
Index (Panel B). Samples are partitioned into two sub-periods based on whether the government is led by military or civilian. 
T-statistics for mean differences between two sub-samples are displayed in two last columns of the table.
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operating in Thailand may not apply to this situa-
tion” especially for the 2014 coup (Steve Vickers & 
Associates, 2014).
This “against-expectation-effect” can be justi-
fied by the uncertain information hypothesis 
suggested by Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988). 
Accordingly, investors react to bad news more 
than to good news. Since the Thai Baht depreci-
ated and the stock index declined during the po-
litical turmoil in 2013 (Lee, 2013), there would be 
upward adjustments after the coup. Therefore, the 
coup was considered as necessary for the long-
term competitiveness and stability of Thai’s econ-
omy (Schmidt, 2007).
Panels A and B in Table 3 describe the differenc-
es in the average daily abnormal return, volatil-
ity, liquidity and liquidity risk of the USD/THB 
between pre and post windows for the 2006 and 
2014 military coup d’états, respectively. It appears 
that in the 2014 military coup d’états, the market 
quality is affected similarly but with lesser magni-
tude to 2006 military coup d’états. Specifically, we 
find, on the military coup date in 2006, the Thai 
Baht depreciated against the US dollar compared 
to 60, 40, 20, 10 and 5 days before the event. The 
FX market was also more volatile, less liquid with 
higher liquidity risk. It was documented to be the 
biggest loss since 2003, in which the Thai Baht 
fell dramatically 1.3 percent from 37.29 the date 
before to 37.77 (Bloomberg, 2006). Nevertheless, 
the effect did not last after the coup. The quick 
recovery of both the stock and currency markets 
(despite slower) was due to investors’ beliefs that 
the coup broke the political roadblock from the 
economy and perceived it as a buying opportunity 
(Barden & Kuramitsu, 2006). However, we find no 
such effect in the 2014 military coup d’états, ex-
cept for the less volatility of abnormal return on 
the event date in comparison to previous peri-
ods. In addition, the market was less liquid only 
Figure 4. Cumulative abnormal market quality in the Thai stock market
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Figure 5. Cumulative abnormal market quality in the Thai currency market
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Table 3. Short-run analysis on the USD/THB
Windows
Return Volatility Liquidity liquidity Risk
Diff. T-stat Diff. T-stat Diff. T-stat Diff. T-stat
Panel A. 2006 coup 
(–60, –1) vs 0 –0.0141 –(5.79) –0.0002 –(13.35) 0.0000 (0.00) –0.0049 –(0.60)
(–40, –1) vs 0 –0.0141 –(5.78) –0.0002 –(13.27) –0.0040 –(0.72) –0.0071 –(1.16)
(–20, –1) vs 0 –0.0142 –(5.80) –0.0002 –(13.72) –0.0062 –(1.83) –0.0089 –(3.17)
(–10, –1) vs 0 –0.0140 –(5.72) –0.0002 –(13.60) –0.0071 –(2.54) –0.0099 –(6.03)
(–5, –1) vs 0 –0.0149 –(6.09) –0.0002 –(13.55) –0.0053 –(1.79) –0.0094 –(5.24)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 5) –0.0012 –(0.38) –0.0001 –(1.56) 0.0012 (0.41) –0.0030 –(0.56)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 10) –0.0011 –(0.50) < 0.0001 –(1.15) 0.0024 (0.90) –0.0036 –(0.82)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 20) –0.0006 –(0.35) < 0.0001 –(0.82) 0.0037 (1.49) –0.0008 –(0.21)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 40) <0.0001 –(0.02) < 0.0001 –(0.33) 0.0030 (1.25) 0.0021 (0.69)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 60) 0.0003 (0.21) < 0.0001 –(0.20) 0.0029 (1.29) 0.0034 (1.22)
Panel B. 2014 coup 
(–60, –1) vs 0 –0.0030 –(1.28) < 0.0001 –(3.66) –0.0008 –(0.07) –0.0068 –(1.07)
(–40, –1) vs 0 –0.0030 –(1.26) < 0.0001 –(3.77) –0.0005 –(0.05) –0.0066 –(0.99)
(–20, –1) vs 0 –0.0028 –(1.18) < 0.0001 –(3.68) –0.0005 –(0.05) –0.0064 –(1.03)
(–10, –1) vs 0 –0.0032 –(1.37) < 0.0001 –(3.46) 0.0015 (0.13) –0.0066 –(1.08)
(–5, –1) vs 0 –0.0030 –(1.29) < 0.0001 –(2.53) –0.0014 –(0.10) –0.0043 –(0.49)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 5) –0.0010 –(1.58) < 0.0001 –(1.82) –0.0049 –(2.09) 0.0007 (0.57)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 10) –0.0004 –(0.44) < 0.0001 –(0.31) –0.0001 –(0.03) –0.0003 –(0.10)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 20) 0.0001 (0.11) < 0.0001 (0.40) –0.0008 –(0.20) < 0.0001 (0.00)
(–60, –1) vs (0,40) 0.0003 (0.32) < 0.0001 (1.07) 0.0006 (0.18) –0.0003 –(0.18)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 60) 0.0003 (0.26) < 0.0001 (0.65) 0.0012 (0.29) –0.0009 –(0.49)
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in the first 5 days after the coup. The less impact 
on the currency market during 2014 coup can be 
explained by its expectation beforehand, when the 
martial law was declared 2 days before.
Similarly, Panels A and B in Table 4 show the dif-
ferences in the average daily abnormal return, 
volatility, liquidity and liquidity risk of the SET 
Index between pre and post windows for the 
2006 and 2014 military coup d’états, respectively. 
Interestingly, we find no difference on the Thai 
stock market performance and quality before and 
after the 2006 coup. The little damage in the stock 
market in the 2006 coup was partly because the 
country’s stock market was already lagged for sev-
eral years and the coup took place peacefully with-
out bloodshed (Cheng, 2006).
However, in the 2014 military coup d’états, there 
is an increase in return volatility for 5 and 10 days 
post event windows, and an increase in trading 
volume for all post event windows. This indicates 
investors actively traded more after the 2014 mili-
tary coup d’états. The protests that took place on 
October 2013 increased the uncertainty environ-
ment for investment, investors’ confidence was 
lost and there were doubts about Thailand’s future 
economy. Unsurprisingly, large amount of funds 
pulled out from the market during this political 
unstable period. It was estimated that foreign in-
vestors pulled 194 billion Thai Baht, equivalent to 
6 billion US dollars in 2013. Just one week in May, 
before the 2014 coup, the withdrawal was 379 mil-
lion US dollars (Shaffer, 2014). The coup helped 
to put an end on that political uncertainty which 
blocked the economic development for a long 
term. The approvals of many billion-dollar-worth- 
investment projects right after the coup raised the 
investors’ confidence and encouraged them to 
trade more. We can conclude that the coup and 
preceding protests, on the one hand, created a 
risky investment environment which was highly 
volatile, but on the other hand, brought invest-
ment opportunities for investors to earn higher 
returns favored by investors.
3.1.2. Short-run and long-run market reactions
Table 5 and 6 report the regression results of the 
coups and other important factors on the four di-
mensions (return, return volatility, liquidity and 
liquidity volatility) of Thai foreign exchange and 
Table 4. Short-run analysis on the SET
Window
Return Volatility Liquidity Liquidity Risk
Diff. T-stat Diff. T-stat Diff. T-stat Diff. T-stat
Panel A. 2006 coup 
(–60, –1) vs 0 0.0068 (0.66) 0.0000 (0.56) –0.6227 –(1.66) –0.6666 –(1.78)
(–40, –1) vs 0 0.0065 (0.62) 0.0000 (0.31) –0.5295 –(1.48) –0.5834 –(1.66)
(–20, –1) vs 0 0.0055 (0.53) 0.0000 (0.23) –0.6613 –(1.74) –0.6971 –(1.85)
(–10, –1) vs 0 0.0058 (0.56) 0.0000 (0.46) –0.5056 –(1.09) –0.5399 –(1.19)
(–5, –1) vs 0 0.0122 (1.17) 0.0000 (0.45) –0.1627 –(0.56) –0.2178 –(0.80)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 5) 0.0042 (0.93) –0.0003 –(0.88) –0.4996 –(1.93) –0.4239 –(1.86)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 10) 0.0038 (0.99) –0.0001 –(0.58) –0.1739 –(0.68) –0.1690 –(0.77)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 20) 0.0005 (0.13) –0.0001 –(0.31) –0.0833 –(0.39) –0.0772 –(0.41)
(–60,–1) vs (0, 40) 0.0004 (0.10) 0.0000 –(0.06) –0.1883 –(0.97) –0.1794 –(1.01)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 60) 0.0007 (0.20) 0.0000 (0.08) –0.2160 –(1.19) –0.2227 –(1.32)
Panel B. 2014 coup 
(–60, –1) vs 0 0.0001 (0.02) 0.0000 –(0.32) –0.6559 –(1.50) –0.5691 –(1.35)
(–40, –1) vs 0 –0.0003 –(0.04) 0.0000 –(0.34) –0.6960 –(1.43) –0.6050 –(1.29)
(–20, –1) vs 0 –0.0012 –(0.17) 0.0000 –(0.28) –0.6605 –(1.53) –0.5791 –(1.36)
(–10, –1) vs 0 –0.0011 –(0.15) 0.0000 (0.05) –0.6933 –(2.80) –0.5914 –(1.76)
(–5, –1) vs 0 0.0001 (0.01) 0.0000 (0.04) –0.6884 –(2.65) –0.6035 –(1.43)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 5) 0.0007 (0.18) –0.0001 –(8.88) –0.6464 –(3.23) –0.5372 –(3.14)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 10) –0.0023 –(0.66) –0.0001 –(5.93) –0.7584 –(4.17) –0.6693 –(4.22)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 20) –0.0009 –(0.32) 0.0000 –(2.76) –0.7727 –(4.44) –0.6896 –(4.08)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 40) –0.0013 –(0.41) 0.0000 –(0.39) –0.7044 –(4.06) –0.6549 –(4.06)
(–60, –1) vs (0, 60) –0.0007 –(0.23) 0.0000 –(0.50) –0.7088 –(4.10) –0.6662 –(4.10)
80
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 15, Issue 2, 2018
stock market quality, respectively. Consistent with 
Lumjiak et al. (2014), we find investors react dif-
ferently in the currency and stock markets both 
in the short run and long run. We find the stock 
market reacts stronger than the currency market. 
Table 5 shows when the net flow of trading by 
foreigners in the Thai stock market (FC_Buy) in-
creases, the Thai Baht appreciates by 0.003 point 
against the US dollar, the currency market ex-
hibits more volatility (coefficient of FC_Buy for 
volatility regression is 0.0112), less liquid (bid-ask 
spread increases by 0.011) and more liquidity risk 
(liquidity increases by 0.00974). These findings ex-
hibit foreigners need to convert their currency in-
to the Thai baht before investing in the Thai stock 
markets. This effect is supported by Gyntelberg, 
Loretan, Subhanij, and Chan (2009) study, which 
suggests that foreign investors’ net purchases of 
domestic equities would create an appreciation 
of its currency. Lumiajiak et al. (2014) also found 
similar effect when studying the effect of the 2006 
coup on the financial markets. 
Based on the short-run effect on the currency mar-
ket (see Table 5), we detect almost opposite market 
reaction to the two military coup d’états. In the 
first military coup d’états in 2006 (variables SR5_
C1 to SR60_C1), the Thai Baht depreciates up to 40 
days after the coup and more volatile in return up 
Table 5. Short-run and long-run analysis on the USD/THB
Variables Return Volatility Liquidity Liquidity Risk
FC_Buy –0.00310** 0.0112** 0.0110* 0.00974*
Military_led –3.68e–05 0.00330*** –0.00136 0.00199
Military*FC_Buy 0.00115 –0.00740* –0.0161** –0.00903
SR5_C1 0.0143*** 0.000165 0.00508 0.0187
SR10_C1 0.00235 0.00197 –0.0349*** 0.0463***
SR20_C1 –0.00124 0.00513 –0.0177 0.0287
SR40_C1 0.00595** 0.000353 0.0126** –0.00635
SR60_C1 –0.000770 0.00401** 0.00307 0.00395
SR5_C1*FC_Buy –0.0395*** –0.00746** –0.00269 –0.0610**
SR10_C1*FC_Buy –0.00390 –0.0120 0.0942*** –0.128***
SR20_C1*FC_Buy 0.00287 –0.0187* 0.0424 –0.0856
SR40_C1*FC_Buy –0.0201** –0.00526 –0.0433*** 0.0110
SR60_C1*FC_Buy 0.000684 –0.0159*** –0.0153 –0.0188
SR5_C2 –0.00925*** 0.000646 0.0475*** 0.0436***
SR10_C2 –0.00561*** 0.000108 0.0165*** 0.00586***
SR20_C2 0.000368 0.000267 0.00233 –0.00958**
SR40_C2 –0.00251 –0.000462 –0.00522 0.00619
SR60_C2 –0.00307 0.000924 –0.00461 0.00654
SR5_C2*FC_Buy 0.0574*** –0.00661 –0.259*** –0.241***
SR10_C2*FC_Buy 0.0198*** –0.00503*** –0.0600*** –0.0241***
SR20_C2*FC_Buy –0.00666 –0.00555** –0.000919 0.0520***
SR40_C2*FC_Buy 0.00616 –0.00117 0.0309 –0.0245
SR60_C2*FC_Buy 0.0160 –0.00859 0.0265 –0.0304
S&P –0.0361*** –0.000723 0.0133 –0.00236
GFC 0.000155 0.000502 0.00114 0.00103
AvgTBT –2.40e–09 –1.44e–08 2.44e–07*** –1.93e–07***
Quote –2.66e–08 –1.40e–07*** 1.32e–07* –7.13e–08
Quoter –2.41e–06 0.000119*** –0.000358*** 0.000165***
Ret1 –0.258*** – – –
RV1 – 0.424*** – –
RV2 – 0.253*** – –
RV3 – 0.110 – –
RV4 – 0.108 – –
LIQ1 – – 0.323*** –
LIQ2 – – 0.263*** –
LIQ3 – – 0.199*** –
LIQ4 – – 0.149*** –
RSV1 – – – 0.481***
RSV2 – – – 0.425***
Constant 0.000779* –0.00503*** 0.00795*** –0.00309**
Observations 3,673 3,673 3,673 3,673
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to 60 days. The liquidity increases in shorter win-
dow (10 days) and then drops in longer window 
(40 days), but the liquidity risk increases only in 
short window (up to 10 days). On the contrary, op-
posite findings are detected during the 5-60 days 
after the 2014 military coup d’états (variables SR5_
C2 to SR60_C2). 
However, these effects reversed when the foreign 
money flows in during these short-term windows 
(interaction variables between SR5_C1 to SR60_
C1, and SR5_C2 to SR60_C2 with FC_Buy). These 
results indicate that the short-term effect of coup 
d’état on Thai currency market is largely affect-
ed by the net stock purchase of foreign investors. 
During the days following the coups, the higher 
purchase on the stock market by foreign investors 
will reduce the volatility of both market return 
and liquidity. This effect is against the expectation 
of more market volatility as hypothesized (H6 and 
H8). In terms of the market return and liquidity, 
the short-term effect of coups is less clear. The coef-
ficients of interaction terms between short-term 
windows and net foreign investors’ stock purchase 
are contrary in the two coups.
For the long-run effect of the military intervention 
(see Table 5), we find minimal impact in the cur-
rency market such that the currency market be-
comes slightly more volatile during the Military-
led government (support of H6). The coefficient 
of “Military_led” government is positive and sig-
nificant in the regression of volatility. This finding 
is consistent with the financial behaviour theory 
that investors tend to overact or underact to the 
news in the short run, but in the long run, when 
they realize their errors, a return reversal will be 
detected (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 
1998). Furthermore, the coefficients on the inter-
action term between “Military_led” and ratio of 
foreign buy in the stock market (FC_Buy) indicate 
that foreign investors place more confidence in the 
military-led government as the currency market 
is less volatile during the military-led government. 
The higher purchase by foreign investors during 
this time also increases the liquidity of the cur-
rency market and thus, supports the positive ex-
pectation about the effect of coup on the currency 
market liquidity (H7). It was reported that after 
the 2014 coup, the Thailand’s Board of Investment 
was appointed on June 8 and approved investment 
incentives for 603 projects worth more than 400 
billion Thai Baht. Budget spending also increased, 
together with massive investment plans in infra-
structure (Saiyasombut, 2014). Therefore, there is 
a strong belief that the coup promotes Thailand’s 
stability and economy competency in the future. 
Turning to the short-term effect on the Thai stock 
market (see Table 6), we find investors react differ-
ently to the two military coup d’états. The 2006 
military coup d’états results in immediate increase 
in return (the coefficient of SR5_C1 is positive and 
significant), drop in volatility, but lower liquidity 
(negative coefficients of SR5_C1 to SR60_C1) and 
higher liquidity risk (positive coefficients of SR5_
C1 to SR60_C1). It also appears that foreign inves-
tors do not time market well, as they earn negative 
return 5 to 10 days after the 2006 military coup 
d’états. These coefficients are –0.079 and -0.062, 
respectively. On contrary, market drops slightly 5 
and 60 days after the 2014 military coup d’états. 
Coefficients of SR5_C2 and SR60_C2 in the re-
gression of stock return are –0.0439 and –0.0179, 
respectively. However, the foreign investors earn 
positive return during these two short-term win-
dows (positive and significant of variables SR5_
C2*FC_Buy and SR6-_C2*FC_Buy). 
The results from the short-term effects of the coup 
provide inconclusive result about its effect on the 
stock market return given the different market re-
actions in the two coups. However, there are sup-
portive evidences about the positive effect of coup 
on liquidity risk (H3) and the negative effect on 
liquidity of the Thai stock market (H4a). In addi-
tion, against the negative expectation about the 
coup’s effect on market volatility, in the short run, 
it shows that the coup reduces the market risk (re-
jection of H2). Nevertheless, these effects are less-
ened by the increase in foreign investors’ net stock 
purchase.
For the long-run effect in the stock market (see 
Table 6), when the net flow of trading by foreign-
ers in the Thai stock market (FC_Buy) increases, 
we find higher return and lower risk. The coeffi-
cient of FC_Buy in Return regression is 0.0317 and 
significant at 0.01 level. In the volatility regression, 
this coefficient is –0.000597 and also significant 
at 0.01 level. Similarly, higher return and lower 
risk is detected during the Military-led govern-
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ment (coefficients of Military_led in Return and 
Volatility regressions are 0.0046 and –0.000153, 
respectively) with the exception for an increase in 
liquidity risk (coefficient = 0.0351). 
While the result is inconclusive for short-term ef-
fect of the coup on the stock market return, the 
long results show that the coup has a positive ef-
fect on the abnormal return of Thai stock market 
(support of H1). The results also provide support 
for the positive effect of the coup on the Thai stock 
market’s liquidity risk (H3). However, similar to 
short-term results, the hypothesis on the positive 
relationship between coup and market volatility 
(H2) is rejected. These effects are also lessened by 
the increase in foreign investors’ net stock pur-
chase. The coefficients on the interaction term be-
tween the Military-led and ratio of foreign buy in 
the stock market (FC_Buy) indicate that foreign-
ers do not time market well during the Military-
led government. It appears foreign investors en-
ter the market when liquidity risk is relatively 
Table 6. Short-run and long-run analyses on the SET
Variables Return Volatility Liquidity Liquidity Risk
FC_Buy 0.0317*** –0.000597*** 0.129 0.0343
Military_led 0.00460** –0.000153** 0.0280 0.0351***
Military*FC_Buy –0.0156** 0.000410* –0.109 –0.113**
SR5_C1 0.0275*** –0.00400*** –1.349** 0.324*
SR10_C1 0.0202 –0.000167* –0.0722 0.383*
SR20_C1 0.0279 –0.000296*** 2.376** 0.679*
SR40_C1 –0.0103 –0.000241** –0.973*** 0.182***
SR60_C1 –0.00714 –0.000289*** –0.670 0.305***
SR5_C1*FC_Buy –0.0790*** 0.0106*** 3.115** –0.870**
SR10_C1*FC_Buy –0.0620** 0.000391 0.0437 –0.777
SR20_C1*FC_Buy –0.0678 0.000753*** –6.311** –1.713*
SR40_C1*FC_Buy 0.0311 0.000607* 2.902*** –0.555***
SR60_C1*FC_Buy 0.0137 0.000738*** 1.728 –0.775***
SR5_C2 –0.0439*** –0.000488 –0.944* 0.0530
SR10_C2 0.0121 –6.47e–05 –1.020*** 0.197***
SR20_C2 –0.0170 –6.83e–05* 0.0750 –0.00553
SR40_C2 0.00164 –5.49e–05 –0.155 –0.0655
SR60_C2 –0.0179*** –8.53e–05** –0.203 –0.0101
SR5_C2*FC_Buy 0.241*** 0.00274 5.103* –0.805
SR10_C2*FC_Buy –0.0247 0.000264 4.511*** –1.159***
SR20_C2*FC_Buy 0.0949 0.000194 –0.324 –0.238
SR40_C2*FC_Buy 0.00679 0.000107 0.802 0.197
SR60_C2*FC_Buy 0.113*** 0.000340* 1.040 0.104
S&P 0.280*** –0.000225 1.023** –0.160
GFC 0.000458 6.90e–05*** 0.00515 –0.00295
AvgTBT 2.40e–08 –2.92e–09*** –2.82e–07 –4.59e–06***
Quote 2.31e–06*** –5.19e–08** 1.02e–06 –6.93e–06***
Ret1 0.00297 – – –
RV1 – 0.308*** – –
RV2 – 0.149 – –
RV3 – –0.0147 – –
RV4 – 0.0539** – –
LIQV1 – – – –0.0243
LIQV2 – – – 0.0291
LIQV3 – – – –0.0151
LIQV4 – – – 0.0530***
LIQV5 – – – 0.0159
LIQV6 – – – 0.00381
Constant –0.0115*** 0.000305*** –0.0332 0.398***
Observations 3,024 3,024 3,024 3,022
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low (–0.113). Their entrance to the market causes 
market to be more volatile (+0.00041) but they 
earn negative return (–0.0156). Poor market per-
formance of foreign investors is attribute to their 
information disadvantages to the local individu-
al investors (Choe, Kho, & Stulz, 2005; Dvořák, 
2005). Similar finding about poor performance of 
foreign investors in Thailand was also found in the 
study of Phansatan, Powell, Tanthanongsakkun, 
and Treepongkaruna (2012).
For the effect of coup on the liquidity of Thai stock 
market, we do not have enough evidence to sup-
port either hypothesis H4a or H4b and conclude 
that there is no effect of coup on the stock market 
liquidity in the long run.
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the effects of coups on Thai financial markets. Using daily data from the stock 
and foreign exchange markets during the period 2005–2017, the study shows the coups exert both short-
run and long-run impact on the stock and foreign exchange markets. However, the effect is different 
between the coups and markets. 
In the short run, the 2006 coup induces Thai Bath to depreciate, more volatile, more liquid with higher 
liquidity risk. However, the 2014 coup strengthens the Thai Bath, reduces its liquidity but increases the 
liquidity risk. The effect lasts longer for the 2006 coup compared to the 2014 coup. For the stock market, 
both coups reduce market volatility and liquidity, but increase the liquidity risk. The 2006 coup increas-
es stock returns, while the 2014 coup leads stock returns to decrease. The persistence effects is high for 
both coups, but more for the 2006 coup. 
In the long run, both coups show their positive impact on the stock market by increasing the SET index 
return and reducing its risk, despite affects the USD/THB negatively by making it more volatile. The 
study also shows that the effects of the coups on Thai financial markets are largely dependent on the 
net stock purchase of foreign investors. The moderation effect takes place in the way that it reverses the 
“pure” effect of the coup (when there is no purchase of foreign investors).
Against common beliefs about negative consequences of the coup d’états, this study suggests that the 
uncertainty surrounding the coups can bring good investment opportunities for investors to earn ab-
normal profits. Moreover, in the long term, the coups can drive the country to better stability and 
development.
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APPENDIX
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Variables Definition
FC_Buy
The percentage of net purchases in Thai baht on Thai stock market by foreign investors relative to all 
trading activities on day t. It represents the net flow in trading activities of foreign investors on the 
Thai stock market
Military_led A dummy variable equals 1 from September 19, 2006 to September 29, 2006 and from May 22, 2014 to September 13, 2017, when government is led by Military, 0 otherwise
Military*FC_Buy The interaction term between FC_Buy and Military_led
SR5_C1 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2006 coup d’etats (Coup1) and equals 1 for the window [0,5]. Day 0 is September 19, 2006
SR10_C1 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2006 coup d’etats (Coup1) and equals 1 for the window [0,10]. Day 0 is September 19, 2006
SR20_C1 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2006 coup d’etats (Coup1) and equals 1 for the window [0,20]. Day 0 is September 19, 2006
SR40_C1 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2006 coup d’etats (Coup1) and equals 1 for the window [0,40]. Day 0 is September 19, 2006
SR60_C1 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2006 coup d’etats (Coup1) and equals 1 for the window [0,60]. Day 0 is September 19, 2006
SR5_C1*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR5_C1 and FC_Buy
SR10_C1*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR10_C1 and FC_Buy
SR20_C1*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR20_C1 and FC_Buy
SR40_C1*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR40_C1 and FC_Buy
SR60_C1*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR60_C1 and FC_Buy
SR5_C2 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2014 coup d’etats (Coup2) and equals 1 for the window [0,5]. Day 0 is May 22, 2014
SR10_C2 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2014 coup d’etats (Coup2) and equals 1 for the window [0,10]. Day 0 is May 22, 2014
SR20_C2 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2014 coup d’etats (Coup2) and equals 1 for the window [0,20]. Day 0 is May 22, 2014
SR40_C2 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2014 coup d’etats (Coup2) and equals 1 for the window [0,40]. Day 0 is May 22, 2014
SR60_C2 A dummy variable that measures the short-run impact of the Thai 2014 coup d’etats (Coup2) and equals 1 for the window [0,60]. Day 0 is May 22, 2014
SR5_C2*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR5_C2 and FC_Buy
SR10_C2*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR10_C2 and FC_Buy
SR20_C2*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR20_C2 and FC_Buy
SR40_C2*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR40_C2 and FC_Buy
SR60_C2*FC_Buy The interaction term between SR60_C2 and FC_Buy
S&P Daily return on S&P500 index to control for world stock market cycle 
GFC A dummy variable to measure the effect of the 2008 global financial crisis. It equals 1 for the period between July 26, 2007 and July 30, 2010, and 0 otherwise
AvgTBT Daily average of the difference between two consecutive quotes for the USD/THB or two prices for the SET Index
Quote Total number of quotes per day (as a proxy for trading volume)
Quoter Total number of quoters per day (as a proxy for competition)
RET1 Daily return lagged by 1. This variable is used to capture for AR structure in the return series
RV1, RV2, RV3, RV4 Daily realised volatility lagged by 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. These variables are used to capture for AR structure in the daily realised volatility series
LIQ1, LIQ2, LIQ3, LIQ4
Daily average bid-ask spread on the USD/THB lagged by 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. These 
variables are used to capture for AR structure in the daily spread on the USD/THB series. Proxy for 
liquidity. The higher the LIQ, the less liquid the market
RVS1, RVS2 Daily variability of liquidity on the USD/THB lagged by 1 and 2, respectively. These variables are used to capture for AR structure in the daily volatility of liquidity series
LNV Daily natural logarithm of trading volume on the SET Index. Proxy for liquidity. The higher the LNV, the more liquid the market
LIQV1, LIQV2, LIQV3, 
LIQV4, LIQV5, LIQV6
Daily variability of liquidity on the SET index lagged by 1, 2, 3…and 6, respectively. These variables 
are used to capture for AR structure in the daily volatility of liquidity series
